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Abstract
Formal methods provide techniques and tools for constructing mathematical models of software sys-
tems and more generally of hardware/software systems. Mathematical models are incrementally developed
and provide informations validated by a proof assistant; the development starts by a simple model and the
process enriches current models by adding details from the requirements; the process leads to a sequence
of models related by the refinement relation and a sequence of directed acyclic graphs stating dependency
among parameters to be computed by the future monitoring tool. Those DAGs together with the events
of models, can be used to generate an architecture of the final system and a code for computing each
parameter. The resulting architecture and the resulting code are produced from formally validated com-
ponents; moreover, DAGs help in the organization of computations among parameters. Our work shows
how formal models and DAGS can be used to build a system on chip using System C.
1 Introduction
1.1 Design of System On Chip
Systems on Chip, or shortly SoCs, and SoC architectures combine problems of specification,
modeling, safety, quality and structuring mechanisms; we present results of a research activity that
we have carried out in collaboration with industrial partners and lead us to a design methodology
for constructing models of the system and for providing formally justified hints on the future
architectural choices. Our works provide also a resulting mathematical model of a tool, which will
be in fine implemented on a chip. Our methodology based on the B event-based method [CM02,
CTB+03, CM03] integrates the incremental development of formal models using a theorem prover
to validate each step of development called refinement. A (mathematical) model is simply defined
as a reactive system with invariant and safety properties and it expresses requirements of the
target SoC, together with hints on the architecture. Our case study is a monitoring tool for
measurement in Digital Video Broadcasting Television (DVB-T) and problems are related to the
number of computations and real-time constraints. The implementation of this tool is driven by
the hierarchy derived from invariants of models.
1.2 Overview of B
Classical B is a state-based method developed by Abrial for specifying, designing and coding
software systems. It is based on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice. Sets
are used for data modeling, “Generalized Substitutions” are used to describe state modifications,
the refinement calculus is used to relate models at varying levels of abstraction, and there are
structuring mechanisms (machine, refinement, implementation) which are used in the organization
of a development. The first version of the B method is extensively described in the B-Book [Abr96].
It is supported by the Atelier B tool [Cle04].
Central to the classical B approach is the idea of a software operation which will perform
according to a given specification if called within a given pre-condition. Subsequent to the for-
mulation of the classical approach, Abrial and others have developed a more general approach
in which the notion of “event” is fundamental. An event has a firing condition (a guard) as op-
posed to a pre-condition. It may fire when its guard is true. Event-based models have proved
useful in requirement analysis, modeling distributed systems and in the discovery/design of both
distributed and sequential programming algorithms.
After extensive experience with B, current work by Abrial is proposing the formulation of a
second version of the method[AM98, Abr03]. This distills experience gained with the event based
approach and provides a general framework for the development of “discrete systems”. Although
the method is generalized, mathematical foundations of both versions of the method are the same.
1.3 Proof-based Development
Proof-based development methods [Bac79, Abr96, Mor90] integrate formal proof techniques in
the development of software systems. The main idea is to start with a very abstract model of the
system under development. Details are gradually added to this first model by building a sequence
of more concrete ones. The relationship between two successive models in this sequence is that of
refinement [Bac79, Abr96, CM88, BvW98]. The essence of the refinement relationship is that it
preserves already proved system properties including safety properties and termination.
A development gives rise to a number of, so-called, proof obligations, which guarantee its cor-
rectness. Such proof obligations are discharged by the proof tool using automatic and interactive
proof procedures supported by a proof engine [Cle04].
At the most abstract level it is obligatory to describe the static properties of a model’s data by
means of an “invariant” predicate. This gives rise to proof obligations relating to the consistency
of the model. They are required to ensure that data properties which are claimed to be invariant
are preserved by the events or operations of the model. Each refinement step is associated with
a further invariant which relates the data of the more concrete model to that of the abstract
model and states any additional invariant properties of the (possibly richer) concrete data model.
These invariants, so-called gluing invariants are used in the formulation of the refinement proof
obligations.
The goal of a B development is to obtain a proved model. Since the development process leads
to a large number of proof obligations, the mastering of proof complexity is a crucial issue. Even
if a proof tool is available, its effective power is limited by classical results over logical theories
and we must distribute the complexity of proofs over the components of the current development,
e.g. by refinement. Refinement has the potential to decrease the complexity of the proof process
whilst allowing for tracability of requirements.
B Models rarely need to make assumptions about the size of a system being modeled, e.g.
the number of nodes in a network. This is in contrast to model checking approaches [CGP00].
The price to pay is to face possibly complex mathematical theories and difficult proofs. The
re-use of developed models and the structuring mechanisms available in B help in decreasing the
complexity. Where B has been exercised on known difficult problems, the result has often been a
simpler proof development than has been achieved by users of other more monolithic techniques.
1.4 Related techniques
The B method is a state-based method integrating set theory, predicate calculus and generalized
substitution language; it provides a way to develop incrementally models of systems by refinement
and by proofs of conditions of verification called proof obligations. There are methodologies for
developing and validating embedded systems as for instance the POLIS approach based on the
POLIS environment [BCG+00]. POLIS integrates techniques of simulation and model checking
in the development of embedded systems. The POLIS system is a co-design environment for
embedded systems based on a formal model of computation namely the Co-design Finite State
Machines model of the CFSM model for short. The main idea is to integrate the translation of a
high level language (Esterel, for instance) into the CFSM language, the formal verification and the
synthesis of systems stated in the CFSM language by translation into the computation model of
existing verification tools, the mean to co-simulate systems and the partitioning and architecture
selection.
Work on action systems are very close to our framework; action systems are a general formalism
equipped with the refinement relation. The main difference relies upon the way we are using
the refinement. In [HS98], the specification is used for modeling the case study but no real
methodology is provided for helping in writing the specification. We obtain a formal model of the
system but we have been able to trace the construction with respect to the requirements. The
final step of our approach is to provide a way to produce code. The formal model allows us to
structure the final system into hardware and software parts.
With our partners (Thales B&M, TDF C2R and LIEN, electronic laboratory of Nancy), in
the EQUAST project, we use our formal models to produce SystemC code [Sys99] and to finally
produce VHDL code by automatic translation from SystemC code. This paper presents some
rules for translating event B models with writing conditions to a “hierarchical” SystemC code
which implements the scheduling and treatments defined in formal models.
1.5 Summary of the paper
The next section presents the construction of a hierarchy of models and the refinement over this
hierarchy. Section 3 introduces the derivation of an efficient algorithm preserving properties of
models. Section 4 presents the generation of a complete architecture in SystemC. We show how
to derive modules for different tasks and communications between these modules with the use of
SystemC facilities. Section 5 concludes and gives future works.
2 Formal derivation of a hierarchy
From the initial specifications, we have constructed B event models with a special attention to
the relation between calculi. In fact, we used invariant properties for classified the results of
computations.
2.1 A formal hierarchy
We can semantically classify errors (and related parameters) using invariant properties that relate
the associated indicators. We take a set of parameters (4 exactly for this example) which can take
three different values:
VALUES = {OK, KO, UND}
Task1, T ask2, T ask3, T ask4 ∈ VALUES
The meaning of the three values is:
• Taskj = OK means than Taskj has been computed and it value is correct.
• Taskj = KO means than Taskj has been computed and it value is bad.
• Taskj = UND means than Taskj has not been computed yet or has no sense.
Finally, we can introduce two next properties:
Property 1 Task2 6= UND ⇒ Task1 = OK that we note Task2 ≺ Task1
Property 2 Task3 6= UND ⇒ Task4 = UND
The first property is dependency property and the next is mutual exclusion properties. Prop-
erty 1 means that when Task2 is active or has computed its value, the Task1 has always computed
its result and the result is correct. Property 1 says that we can not compute Task2 while Task1
has not computed a good value. This property precises the scheduling of treatments, we know
exactly the progression of the different calculi in the hierarchy.
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Figure 1: Progression of computation
Last, property 2 expresses the mutual exclusion of two tasks and mean that we can not activate
Task3 and Task4 at same time. For example, if the two tasks Task3 and Task4 are independent,
we can minimize something. We can load, on the same part of a FPGA for example, the im-
plementation of the concerned tasks. This mechanism is called dynamic reconfiguration and the
property 2 of our models determines the different possible configurations for a set of tasks.
Finally, we can see the progression of computation in the hierarchy: the root of the hierarchy
is the most important parameter, all parameters are dependent on it. When a parameter is
computed and is OK, the computation of these parameters that directly depend on it can be
scheduled. With type of current data, any branch is not computed since not defined or in error
state. Cases are shown in figure 1.
2.2 Transitivity of the relation ≺
We prove, with some B formal models, than the dependency relation ≺ defined between results
of computation is transitive. We have proved easily this interesting property with Click’n’Prove
[AC03, Cle04]. The proof is completely automatic and we do not detail the proof construction
(This proof is a simple “do case”) in this present article. Finally we state:
TaskC ≺ TaskB ∧ TaskB ≺ TaskA ⇒ TaskC ≺ TaskA
The relation defined and used in our model is an order relation which permits the scheduling
of computations. The transitivity of this relation is an important property for an easy refinement
as shown in the next section.
If the relation is transitive, the detection of a cycle in the hierarchy constructed is the proof of an
important inconsistency in the specification. If the hierarchy contains a cycle, each task included
in this cycle must wait the correct end (OK) of all it predecessors. There is a deadlock because
all tasks must be evaluated at, exactly, the same time and with the property of the relation,
resulting of all tasks are never incorrect. Because results of all tasks can not be incorrect, we
affirm than the cycle existence in a hierarchy is a proof of inconsistency. Finally, we can assert
that the hierarchy is an acyclic graph (DAG).
In our case study, we have not found cycles during all the modeling. We affirm that it is a
validation of the consistency of initial specifications (here normative requirements) because we
can possibly execute all defined tasks and all defined results are reachable.
2.3 Refining the directed acyclic graph
The B method is based on the refinement notion and the use of refinement permits us to incre-
mentally construct hierarchy. A correct way for introducing parameters with refinement is adding
of “new” computations as leaves of the incremental hierarchy (see figure 2). But with the proof of
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Figure 2: Incremental hierarchy obtained by different refinements
transitivity of the dependency relation, we can introduce also, in the hierarchy, new parameters
without loss of consistency, as shown in figure 2.
In this second case, the refinement introduces an intermediate result needed to compute the
leaf. It is not the best way to refine and this shows that there is a little error on the importance
of computations in the normative requirements. As shown previously, the proof of transitivity of
dependency relation ensures than the consistency of the incremental hierarchy is preserved.
Finally, the adding of new computations is more easy when tasks are adding as leaves of the
hierarchy; it is the normal way of refinement. The adding of new calculi in the hierarchy itself
is possible, without lost of the global consistency, but is more difficult and is less “natural”. If
the defined relation was not transitive, new computations could only be introduced at the top of
hierarchy or as leaves, and this is a strong constraint. The initial requirement doesn’t explain the
scheduling of computation and the construction of formal incremental models with this constraint
is really hard. In our case study, we find an example of important computations described as
optional calculi.
3 Deriving an algorithm
3.1 Task as a set of events
We present now the dynamic aspect of our models: events. B events are used in our models to
simule task computation: a single computation C is represented by two events that respectively
model success (OK) and failure (KO) of C:
event C OK =
SELECT
TaskB = OK∧
TaskC = UND∧
CondC
THEN
TaskC := OK‖
x : S′(x)
END
event C KO =
SELECT
TaskB = OK∧
TaskC = UND∧
¬CondC
THEN
TaskC := KO
END
The two events represent the computation TaskC and the assignments of the variable TaskC
indicate the end of this computation. The guards of the two events preserve the invariant and, in
particular, the property of order relation: TaskC 6= UND ⇒ TaskB = OK.
In general, for each task we construct a couple of events (for the two possible results OK and
KO) with respect of invariant properties (order relation). In a couple of events, the guards contain
properties to preserve the invariant (based on order relation) and “calculi needing” properties
(CondC in our example). These properties model the computation itself and must describe the
different actions made by task for its evaluation.
3.2 Pseudo-code generation
It is easy to imagine the pseudo-C code that evaluates the two results TaskB and TaskC , when
we suppose than TaskA has been correctly evaluated. In the next generated code, the variables
TaskX serve only as control variables and have not a strong meaning, and they can be eliminated
altogether. With the use of sensitivity mechanism of SystemC [Sys99], we can easily implement
these controls (see part 4). The different assignments of these control variables have different
meanings too:
• TaskX = OK means that computations can progress.
• TaskX = KO means that an error must be indicated.
TaskA = OK;
if CondB then
/ ∗ event B OK code ∗ /
TaskB= OK;
/ ∗ update variables x : S(x) ∗ /
if CondC then
/ ∗ event C OK code ∗ /
TaskC= OK;
/ ∗ update variables x : S′(x) ∗ /
else
/ ∗ event C KO code ∗ /
TaskC= KO;
/ ∗ Error detected ∗ /
/ ∗ End of analysis ∗ /
endif
else
/ ∗ event B KO code ∗ /
TaskB= KO;
/ ∗ Error detected ∗ /
/ ∗ End of analysis ∗ /
endif
The structure of the generated code is interesting because we can really see the succession of
computations. The then part of conditionals contains the stack of all dependent computations,
with respect to the hierarchy, whereas the else branches of conditionals contain the error for the
current computation. The dependent computations are not executed as defined in our B models
and derived hierarchy.
In conclusion, we confirm that control variables TaskX have not a real utility and we can sup-
press, in the previous code, these variables. Because error is hierarchic, we can use some common
variables errorn with an error code for implementing the detection of an incorrect result in any
task (TaskX = KO). In this way, we limit the number of variables used in our implementation.
On another hand, the assignment TaskX= OK is not interesting because, from the structure of
the code itself and without know the value of TaskX , we see precisely execution of the algorithm.
The generated code implements the computation of all tasks with a total respect to incremental
hierarchy defined by the structure of the code itself. But, our goal is the construction of hardware
architecture and not really the resulting sequential algorithm (interesting in it structure).
4 Translation of B event into SystemC
The SystemC language offers facilities for modular construction and sensitivity of modules on
input. In fact, a module declares input and output ports and methods. The principle of sensitivity
is the activation of method, when inputs are changed.
4.1 General principles
We start from a hierarchy proved with the B formal method and produce SystemC code that
satisfies important properties of formal models and of hierarchy in its architecture (see figure 3).
The hierarchy is derived from the formal models with invariant property and guards of events.
It requires a scheduling for computations. Evaluation of a connect stops when the first error is
encountered. In fact, we propose some rules for the translation of hierarchy in SystemC modules
and connectors with different modules. The main idea of our translation is the generation of a
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module for each different tasks. We can, with facilities of SystemC, implement control variables
and structure of the previous algorithm by input ports with sensitivity. With this approach,
modules are automatically executed when necessary without tests. First, we select the two events
modeling the evaluation of a calculus. From the guards of these events and invariant properties,
(more generally hierarchy) we can derive input ports and the sensitivity of the module:
• the presence of a TaskX = OK property in the two guards and a dependency property in
the invariant implies the generation of a sensitive to input port.
• the result of the treatment is systematically writing on an output port (eventually error).
• the use of other identifiers implies the generation of input ports for each different identifier.
With the action part of the event, we can derive the code of the module and the output ports.
4.2 General architecture
We require a standard structure for the generated architecture. The final architecture implements
the hierarchy represented in the B models, but must also satisfy constraints related to electronics.
In particular, we must anticipate a reset module for the system and an interfacemodule needed
for the communication between environnement and system. We briefly describe the two modules
interface and reset:
• The module interface has for input the initial data. It implements the extraction of
information contained in data that is required by the computing tasks and distributes this
information to concerned modules.
• The module reset has for input the output of modules implementing tasks at the leaves
of the hierarchy but not least. When these are finished, this module resets all channels of
communication and all values for the next computation.
Therefore, the generated system looks like the architecture on figure 4.
4.3 A simple B model
We illustrate our approach by a simple but complete example. We start from a B model which
models a simple hierarchy composed by the three computations used TaskA, TaskB and TaskC
with a dependency relation. First we present the header and the invariant of our model:
SETS
VALUE = {OK ,KO ,UND};
DATA
CONSTANTS
getA, getB , getC , getD
...
VARIABLES
current ,memory ,
TaskA,TaskB ,TaskC , ...
INVARIANT
current ∈ DATA∧
memory ∈ N → N
...
/ ∗ Dependancies of tasks ∗ /
(TaskB 6= UND ⇒ TaskA = OK )
(TaskC 6= UND ⇒ TaskA = OK )
In our model, the variable current represents the current data (packet for example) and the
different functions getA, getB, getC and getD are some “reading functions”. This kind of B
variables model the research of informations needed for tasks in the data. For example, we can
imagine the reading of a flag or a field in the header of a packet. The memory variable models a
memory storing important informations for treatments of TaskB.
For translating B events to SystemC, we must state writing conventions: the set V ALUE
contains the three possible values for results of computations. The INVARIANT clause consists
of the order relation which represent the previous hierarchy.
The two tasks TaskB and TaskC can be executed at the same time when TaskA is completed
and we will maintain this parallelism in the final obtained architecture.
4.4 Events of computation
We present now the events associated with the different computations:
eventA OK =
SELECT
TaskA = UND∧
getA(current) = OK
THEN
TaskA := OK
END
eventA KO =
SELECT
TaskA = UND∧
getA(current) 6= OK
THEN
TaskA := KO
END
The two events shown above represent the computation of the variable TaskA. The condition
getA(current) = OK in the guard of the first event (and the opposite in the second) represents the
computation itself and is different from the condition TaskA = UND which controls the execution
of the events.
eventB OK =
SELECT
TaskA = OK∧
TaskB = UND∧
memory(getB(current)) =
getD(current) − 1
THEN
TaskB := OK‖
memory(getB(current)) :=
getD(current)
END
eventB KO =
SELECT
TaskA = OK∧
TaskB = UND∧
memory(getB(current)) 6=
getD(current) − 1
THEN
TaskB := KO
END
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Figure 5: Generated architecture with three modules
These two events represent the computation of the task TaskB. We can easily differentiate
the scheduling properties of the guard and the properties modeling the computation itself.
eventC OK =
SELECT
TaskA = OK∧
TaskC = UND∧
getC (current)) = OK
THEN
TaskC := OK‖
END
eventC KO =
SELECT
TaskA = OK∧
TaskC = UND∧
getC (current)) = KO
THEN
TaskC := KO
END
The two last events represents the computing of TaskC . As above, the property getC(current)) =
KO represents the computation of the task.
4.5 Resulting architecture
The code of each couple of events (eventX ∗) is implemented in different modules. The major
difficulty of the translation is to separate the different informations contained in the guards of
events. As described, some conditions contained in guards are used, with invariant properties,
for hierarchy and scheduling of treatments. On the other hand, some properties of event guards
are used for treatments itself. In this case, the invariant of model does not contain specific
informations and the concerned properties in the guard are only a conditional.
All different modules have an error output port and write an error code on this output port
error, if necessary. A module named ERROR is generated for the treatments of this different error.
This module contains an array for stock the errors detected by the different modules. When
treatment of an error is achieved, the output port flag_end_error is positioned to up (true).
This module ERROR is need for statistical evaluation in our case study but we can imagine another
application where this module is not created. Because the system detects only one error at the
same time, on a sequential connect of modules, there is no conflict between two modules which
want writing on the same communication canal at the same moment. This statement is trivially
deduced from the hierarchy built in the B models because of the dependency relation used. If a
computation has a bad result, all dependent computations are not evaluated and, of course, can
not produce or detect an error. In the case of parallelism, two or more errors can appears at the
same time but these error are not in the same connect of hierarchy. We used a different port error
for each separate connect because of parallelism. The figure 5 shows the resulting architecture
from our simple example and the interaction between modules.
We present now the headers of the generated modules. For the moment, the generation of this
code is manual but we plan that an automatic translation is possible. We present now the header
file named eval_X.h obtained for the computation of TaskX :
MODULE{EVAL X) {
// Input por t s o f module
s c i n <???> getX ;
s c i n<bool> f lag end Y , . . . ; // f l a g end o f a l l f a t h e r s o f Task X
// Output por t s o f module
sc out <int> error X ; // code o f error
sc out <bool> f l ag end X ; // end o f treatments
// Treatments o f module
void treatments ( ) ;
SC CTOR(EVAL X) {
SC METHOD( treatments ) ;
s e n s i t i v e p o s << f l ag end Y << . . . ; // s e n s i t i v i t y
d o n t i n i t i a l i z e ( ) ;
}
} ;
The generated header file of module lists all the “end flags” of all its fathers. The method
treatments is sensitive to the union of all father flags and we write it in SystemC: sensitive_pos
<< flag_end_Y << ... . This notation means than the method treatments is executed when
one of its input port going up (ie the value of an input port going up from false to true). The
getX input port contains informations needed for the treatments of TaskX and the type of this
port is the type of the informations needed.
In our simple example, the module EVAL_A implements the root of the hierarchy and is called
when a new item of data is ready. There is no dependency on another computation. The two
outputs of the module are the error and an indicator for executing dependent modules. The
notation sensitive << data_A means than the method treatments is always executed when
the input port data_A is modified.
The module EVAL_B (instantiation of module EVAL_X) implements the computation of TaskB.
Because there is a dependency TaskB ≺ TaskA in our B model, this module is triggered when its
input flag_end_A is going up (we generate the instruction sensitive_pos << flag_end_A).
This sensitivity implements correctly the dependency between TaskA and TaskB. For the
same reasons, the module EVAL_C (instantiation of module EVAL_X but contained in header file
eval_C.h) is a correct implementation of the computation of TaskC with respect to the formal
hierarchy. We can finally conclude that the proposed architecture implements correctly the formal
hierarchy defined in the B model.
The next listing shows the treatments generated and implemented in the module EVAL_B. This
example is little complicated but it represents a correct translation from events to the SystemC
code. From the two guards of the concerned events (see page 8), we can deduce a conditional and
the two different assignments of the B variable TaskB are translated in writing on different output
ports flag_end_B and error_B. The new assignment of the B variable memory is implemented
by the new generated module memory. Module EVAL_B sends the needed informations (ie index
and value) to memory via canals index and memVal. If an error occurs, a specific error code (here
2) for TaskB is written on the specific error_B port.
#include ”evalB . h”
void EVAL B : : treatments ( ) {
i f (memVal . read ( ) == getD . read ()−1)
{ // generated from evalB OK event
f l ag end B . wr i t e ( true ) ;
memVal . wr i t e ( getD . read ( ) ) ;
index . wr i t e ( getB . read ( ) ) ; }
else
{ // generated from evalB KO event
e r ro r B . wr i t e ( 2 ) ;}
}
The next code shows treatments of the module memory with two different methods Read and
Write with different sensitivities and an array mem for memory. Method Read is sensitive on a
changing value of getD (sensitive << getD) and method Write is sensitive on a changing of
index (sensitive << index).
#include ”memory . h”
void MEMORY: : Read ( ) {
memVal . wr i t e (mem[ getD . read ( ) ] ) ;
}
void MEMORY: : Write ( ) {
mem[ index . read ( ) ] = memVal . read ( ) ;
}
Finally, the generated module reset for the defined hierarchy is probably the most complex
and difficult to realise because it must re-initialize all connections for treatment of new data after
the end of treatments of current data. Determining the end of treatments in the hierarchy (DAG)
is tough. We present the different cases for our example:
• TaskA produces an error; treatments of current data are ending. More generally, if an error
occurs at the top of DAG, others computations are not necessary.
• TaskB and TaskC are completed and correct; all treatments are finished and correct. More
generally, all leaves of hierarchy are completed and correct.
• TaskB is finished and correct but TaskC is completed and incorrect; the current data were
completely treated and the system must be reinitialized. More generally, all branches of
hierarchy must give an output (error or completely ending) before execute the reset module.
• the last case is symmetric with respect to previous.
Finally the generated module reset must consider all different cases of ending. We propose to
implement these treatments in different methods of the module reset with different sensibilities.
For example, a method internAnd can be used to implement the end of all treatments. This
method can be generated from the B model because we know exactly the set of the leaves of
formal hierarchy.
void r e s e t : : internAnd ( ) {
I n tS i g . wr i t e ( f l ag end B . read ( ) && f lag end C . read ( ) ) ;
} // internAnd
In this code, IntSig is an intern signal of the module reset and the next method GeneralReset
is sensitive on an up front of this signal:
void r e s e t : : Genera lReset ( ) {
f l ag end A . wr i t e ( fa l se ) ;
f l ag end B . wr i t e ( fa l se ) ;
f l ag end C . wr i t e ( fa l se ) ;
. . .
} //GeneralReset
5 Conclusion and future works
With some restrictions on the writing of B models, we can easily translate our B developments
to SystemC and generate the different modules and their connections. The architecture obtained
implements the properties of B models and, in particular, it conserves the scheduling and the
dependency relation from the hierarchy. A difficulty in our work is the distinction of the different
cases of ending and their implementations in a particular module. The code SystemC, produced
with our rules from B models, is really implementable in a circuit; some rewriting are needed
for an optimal translation from our SystemC code to synthetisable VHDL in particular in RESET
module. The VHDL code obtained after these little transformations is synthetisable. Tests of
SystemC code have validated the built architecture on electronic aspects. Generated SystemC
code is well structurated, lisible and it is easy to test separately each module for a greater test
covering.
In another hand, a used of the mutual exclusion presented by property 2 with SystemC modules
gives a solid base for the construction of the dynamic reconfiguration possibilities. All modules
generated are, by construction and formally, correctly structured and we work on the deduction
of an algorithm for dynamic reconfiguration from B models.
Some future works are the writing of a complete translator for generate automatically the
SystemC code from B models and the writing of real treatments case for study the applicability
and scalability of the idea.
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[CM02] D. Cansell and D. Méry. Integration of the proof process in the system development
through refinement steps. In Eugenio Villar, editor, 5th Forum on Specification &
Design Language - Workshop SFP in FDL’02 , Marseille, France, Sep 2002.
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